Experiments in cognitive psychology usually return two dependent variables: the percentage of errors and the reaction time of the correct responses. Ashby (1978, 1983) proposed the inverse efficiency score (IES) as a way to combine both measures and, hence, to provide a better summary of the findings. In this article we examine the usefulness of IES by applying it to existing datasets. Although IES does give a better summary of the findings in some cases, mostly the variance of the measure is increased to such an extent that it becomes less interesting. Against our initial hopes, we have to conclude that it is not a good idea to limit the statistical analyses to IES without further checking the data.
Speed and accuracy as dependent variables
Most studies in experimental cognitive psychology involve participants performing some task. These studies typically return two dependent variables (DV): the proportion of errors (PE) and the latency of the correct responses (i.e., the time elapsed between the onset of the stimulus and the onset of the response), expressed as the Reaction Time or RT. Most of the time the variables are analysed separately, which tends to complicate the interpretation.
First, authors check whether the conclusions based on PE and RT go in the same direction, or whether there is evidence for a speed-accuracy trade-off. In the latter case, the conditions with faster responses have higher error rates. In such a situation it usually is impossible to reach a convincing conclusion. When PE and RT point in the same direction, authors tend to focus on the RT analysis, unless the percentage of errors is high (e.g., more than 15%) or the PE analysis returns a significant effect in the predicted direction whereas the RT analysis does not.
The situation would be simplified if PE and RT could be integrated into a single DV, which appropriately weighs the impact of speed and accuracy. Such a measure has been proposed by Ashby (1978, 1983) .
The inverse efficiency score
To deal with the issue of how to combine speed and error, Townsend and Ashby (1978) proposed the "inverse efficiency score" (IES; see also Townsend & Ashby, 1983) . IES can be thought of as an observable measure that gauges the average energy consumed by the system over time (or the power of the system; Townsend & Ashby, 1983, p. 204) . It consists of RT divided by (or by PC, the proportion of correct responses). So, for a given participant the mean (or median) RT of the correct responses in a particular condition is calculated and divided by ( ) or by PC:
Since RTs are expressed in ms and divided by proportions, IES is expressed in ms as well. For instance, if a participant in a particular condition responds with an average RT of 652 ms and makes 5% errors, then IES = 652/(1-.05) = 652/.95 = 686 ms. At first sight, IES seems to have all the properties which we would want the combined measure to show. When two conditions have the same average RT but differ in PE, then the IES of the condition with the higher PE will increase more than the IES of the condition with the lower PE. So, a condition A with RT = 650 ms and PE = .05 will have IES = 684 ms, whereas a condition B with RT = 650 ms and PE = .07 will have IES = 699 ms. Similarly, when there is a trade-off between speed and accuracy, the IES effect will compensate for the differences in PE. Take, for instance, condition A with RT = 650 ms and PE = .05, and condition B with RT = 640 ms and PE = .06. Then condition A has IES = 684 ms, against IES = 681 ms for condition B (see, however, below for a serious limitation of this use of IES).
For the above reasons, a number of researchers in various fields of experimental cognitive psychology have started to use the IES measure (e.g., Akhtar & Enns, 1989; Christie & Klein, 1995; Goffaux, Hault, Michel, Vuong, & Rossion, 2005; Jacques & Rossion, 2007; Kennett, Eimer, Spence, & Driver, 2001; Kuefner, Viola, Vescovo, & Picozzi, 2010; Minnebusch, Suchan, & Daum, 2009; Murphy & Klein, 1998) .
An example where IES works well
A study by Rossignol, Bruyer, Philippot, and Campanella (2009) nicely illustrates the potential of IES versus separate analyses of PE and RT. Participants had to identify the emotional expression displayed by morphed faces, which were blends of an emotional expression and a neutral expression. Six different emotional expressions, each blended with the neutral expression, were used and participants had to say which emotion they thought was shown. The relative contribution of the emotional expression varied from 10% to 90% in steps of 10%. As expected, participants were faster when the emotional expression was stronger: RT decreased with increasing impact of emotional expression (Figure 1 ). However, the longest RTs were not observed for the condition with 10% emotional expression, but for the condition with 30% emotional expression. This is the type of pattern typically observed when two different emotions are morphed (e.g., anger and sadness). When one emotion strongly dominates (e.g., 90% anger and 10% sadness, or 10% anger and 90% sadness), RTs are fast. Somewhere in the middle of the continuum, there is a category boundary (from anger to sadness) around which RTs are long. Did the results of Rossignol et al. (2009) imply that neutral faces were a category as well? Evidence against this interpretation was found in PE. Accuracy dropped for morphs with low contributions of the emotional expression (particularly 10% and 20%), because participants could no longer identify the emotion that was displayed. When the latencies of the correct responses were weighted by the proportion of correct responses, that is to say when IES was calculated, another picture emerged. The IES-curve kept rising up to the 10% condition (Figure 1 ), in line with a Signal Detection view saying that the neutral expression consisted of noise against which the emotional signal was perceived. Given that the latter is a better description of what was going on in the study of Rossignol et al. (2009) , the IES curve provides us with a more accurate picture of the data than the RT curve.
IES is not always better than RT
Unfortunately, further analysis indicated that the situation is not always as clear-cut as in the example above. Take, for example, a study published by Goffaux et al. (2005) . In this study, participants were shown triads of faces: a target face at the top of a triangle, and two comparison faces at the bottom angles. The comparison faces consisted of the target and a distractor. All faces were filtered so that only low spatial frequencies (LFS), only high spatial frequencies (HSF), or the full spectrum of spatial frequencies (Full) were displayed. In addition, the distractor face could differ locally (i.e., had differ-ent features), globally (had a different overall shape), or both locally and globally. Participants had to indicate which comparison face matched the target face. A 3x3 (filter * type of distractor) ANOVA was computed. The main effect of distractor was significant for both RT and IES. However, for RT, this was due to an advantage of the conditions local and local + global, which did not differ from each other, over the condition global, whereas for IES all pairwise comparisons were significant. Thus, a new effect emerged after the IES transformation. The interaction between spatial filter and type of distractor was significant both for RT and IES, but had a different shape. When global distractors were used, the analysis of RTs revealed an advantage of HFS and Full (which did not differ from each other) over LSF. However, with the IES measure there was no significant difference between the three conditions. Thus, an effect observed with RT disappeared after the IES transformation.
We ran similar analyses of other studies we had access to. Four patterns emerged: (a) no change after transformation (Campanella, Bruyer, Froidbise, Rossignol, Joassin, Kornreich et al., 2010; Christie & Klein, 1995; Jacques & Rossion, 2007; Kennett et al., 2001) ; (b) the disappearance of significant effects with IES (Kuefner et al., 2010) ; (c) the apparition of significant effects with IES (Bruyer, Mejias, & Doublet, 2007) ; and (d) the disappearance and RT IES apparition of significant effects in the same study (Bruyer, Leclère, & Quinet, 2004; Constant, Lancereau, Gillain, Delatte, Ferauge, & Bruyer, in press; Goffaux et al., 2005; Joassin, Maurage, Campanella, & Bruyer, 2006; Rossignol et al., 2009) . So, it is not the case that IES always clarifies matters. It looks pretty much like every type of change is possible with the introduction of IES. The reason why IES has no straightforward relationship with RT is that it combines two variables subject to sampling error. This increases the variability of the measure. In addition, it is not clear whether the division of RT by PC is always a good reflection of the relative weights of speed and accuracy. To examine these weaknesses, we made use of an effect that is well documented and for which there are many data available. One of the best established effects in cognitive psychology is the word frequency effect in lexical decision: participants decide much better that a letter string is a word rather than a nonword when the letters make a high-frequency word than when they make a low-frequency word. In addition, there are now lexical decision times for thousands of words, making it possible to get a clear image of the word frequency effect across the entire range. 
Figure 2
The word frequency effect in the French Lexicon Project (Ferrand et al., 2010 Figure 3 shows the effect for IES. Although the effect looks stronger, the confidence intervals indicate that there is much more noise in the data. Indeed, whereas word RTs never exceeded 1,500 ms, individual word IESvalues went up to more than 15,000 (large RT and PC < .10). As a result, the percentage of variance explained by frequency is much less for IES (R² = .12 for a 3 degree polynomial) than for RT (R² = .33 for a 3 degree polynomial). Only when the analysis was limited to those words with a PC of .90 and more did we find equivalent percentages of variance explained for RT and IES (R² = .28).
Situations in which IES may be problematic
The preceding analyses suggest that IES is better not used when PC < .90. When high errors rates are observed, three problems arise (Akhtar & Enns, 1989) . The first problem is that high numbers of errors imply that the number of correct responses is low, so that estimates of correct latencies become
Figure 3
The word frequency effect in the French Lexicon Project for IES. Bars indicate the 95% confidence interval rather unstable. The second problem is that some of these "correct" responses are probably the result of guesses or even "mistakes" (e.g., the participant wanted to indicate that the low-frequency word was not a word, but pressed the wrong button). Finally, the multiplication of RT due to PC is not linear, but accelerates the lower PC becomes (e.g., RT is multiplied by 1 when PC = 1.0, by 1.1 when PC = .90, but by 1.4 when PC = .70 and by 1.7 when PC = .60). In all likelihood, the multiplication weight of accuracy becomes too high for low PC-values. This is particularly a problem in situations where the lower limit of correct guessing is low, for instance in the experiment of Rossignol et al. (2009) where six different expressions were used. Although in a lexical word/non-word decision experiment, it can be defended that no PCs under .60 are meaningful (otherwise the participant is simply guessing or does not know the word), in an experiment with 6 response alternatives meaningful PCs can go as low as 1/6 = .17, meaning that for these accuracy levels RTs can be multiplied by up to 6. Furthermore, Ashby (1978, 1983) warned that the IES only works when there is a positive correlation between RT and PE: the IES transformation should be used only if high and linear correlations are evidenced. So, Townsend and Ashby advise not to use IES in cases of speed-accuracy trade-off. A preliminary check to make sure that RT and PE are positively correlated was done by Akhtar and Enns (1989) , but seems to be absent in many other studies. Indeed, Christie and Klein (1995) , Goffaux et al. (2005) , Jacques and Rossion (2007) , Kennett et al. (2001) , Kuefner et al. (2010) , and Murphy and Klein (1998) simply reported the usual separate analyses of accuracy, correct latencies, and IES without any further information. Minnebusch et al. (2009) did not analyse accuracy and correct latencies but only IES. Kennett et al. (2001) and Murphy and Klein (1998) mentioned the problem of the speed-accuracy trade-off, saying that some participants might show the effects of interest for speed and others for accuracy, but did not address the issue directly in their statistical analyses.
Furthermore, as our example of the French Lexicon Project shows, a positive correlation between RT and PE does not guarantee that more variance will be explained in the IES measures than in the RT measure (the correlation between RT and PE in Ferrand et al. (2010) is r[38333] = 0.56, p < 0.001).
Conclusions
Although we set out with high hopes that the IES measure could be a better and a more concise variable than RT and PE to convey the findings of a cognitive psychology experiment, our analyses have shown that the "blind" use of IES as DV is likely to lead to interpretation problems. The main issue is that IES increases the variability of the data. This became very clear in the statis-tical analysis of the data from the French Lexicon Project: although the frequency effect on average seemed clearer for IES than for RT (Figures 2 and  3) , the percentage of variance explained in IES by word frequency was less than half of the variance explained in RT. This remained the case even when the words were limited to those with PC > .66. Only for the words with PC > .90 was the amount of variance explained in IES and RT the same. Further analyses will have to indicate whether some other combination of RT and PC [e.g., log (IES)] is a better measure.
The increase in variability will be particularly problematic in studies with small numbers of observations per condition (as is mostly the case in cognitive psychology). If a condition only has 20 stimuli, then 2 errors already make a difference of .10 in PC. Depending on where in the range this 10% falls, RT multiplications will range from 1.1 (from 1.00 to .90) to 2.0 (from .20 to .10). For RTs around 600 ms, this means increases from 60 to 600 ms, which are considerably larger than the RT effects generally investigated in cognitive psychology (which tend to be in the order of 20-60 ms). In general, an increase in the variance of the DV will diminish the power of the experiment. Occasionally, however, it may result in a spurious effect, when by chance a few more mistakes are made in one condition than in the other. This will lead to Type I errors (the illusion of having found a significant difference, whereas in reality there is none), which is particularly a problem if journals are more likely to publish "statistically significant" effects than null-effects. In our experience, spurious effects are most likely in the interaction terms of multivariable experiments.
All in all, IES only seems to have value when the number of errors is small and when there is a high correlation between RT and PE, indicating that both variables are in unison. Even then, it is presumably safer to calculate RT and PE as well, to make sure that IES is in line with them. On the basis of our analyses, we have to conclude that it is not a good idea to limit the analyses to IES without any further checking of the data.
